Jagran Opinion: Counterterrorism, Connectivity And China Reset — India's SCO Push

After a seven-year break, Prime Minister Narendra Modi was in China to attend the 25th meeting of the Heads of State Council of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) in Tianjin, China, from August 31 to September 1. The summit gathered leaders from 20 nations, including 10 permanent members and 10 heads of international organisations, to demonstrate unity within the Global South amid tariff wars unleashed by United States President Donald Trump, conflicts, and rising great-power rivalries.

Prime Minister Modi used the platform to reiterate India’s priorities clearly. He pressed the SCO to take an unambiguous stance against terrorism, directly condemning the Pahalgam terror attack carried out by Pakistan. Unlike the double standards on display at the 22nd SCO Defence Ministers’ Meeting in June, the joint declaration explicitly condemned the Pahalgam terror attack. For New Delhi, this outcome not only reasserted the SCO Charter's central mission of combating terrorism but also turned global attention toward Pakistan’s sponsorship of terrorism against member countries and Eurasia.

SCO’s Internal Fault Lines

The SCO however remains riddled with internal contradictions. Several members exploit the forum for narrow security and geopolitical gains, creating trust issues and disagreements within the forum. As a result, the forum has remained largely ineffective in responding to major regional crises, including terrorism, connectivity gaps, and the situation in Afghanistan.

China’s role has been particularly problematic. Beijing continues to shield Pakistan for its use of terrorism as a strategic tool against India, supporting Pakistan at global and regional forums, supplying it with over 80 per cent of its defence equipment between 2020 and 2024, and backing Islamabad during India’s counterterror Operation Sindoor. Beijing’s parochial strategic interests have thus made the Af-Pak region a cradle of terrorism that undermines regional connectivity, security, and economic growth, weakening the SCO.

India’s Regional Leverage

Since joining the SCO as a full member in 2017, India has sought to reorient the SCO toward genuine connectivity and cooperative endeavours that respect sovereignty. New Delhi's priorities centred on a shared culture and a common future for the region, emphasising reliable, resilient, and diversified supply chains that require better connectivity while respecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of member states. New Delhi leveraged the SCO forum to advance its geopolitical and strategic goals in Central Asia and to counterbalance China's assertive influence. Given New Delhi’s proactive stance towards the region, Central Asian countries also admitted India into the Astana Agreement in 2018, and have demonstrated heightened interest in the Chabahar Port and Eastern Route on the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC). The first India-Central Asia virtual summit in 2022, emphasised the Chabahar Port in the INSTC. It also established a Joint Working Group (JWG) to enhance regional connectivity and trade via this port. Similarly, in June of this year, India and Central Asia jointly explored rare earths and critical minerals during the fourth India-Central Asia dialogue in New Delhi. This move followed Beijing's restrictions on rare earth exports for clean energy and defence. Notably, Central Asia is increasingly seen as a potential rival to Beijing's dominance, given its rich reserves of rare earth elements. For instance, Kazakhstan alone has over 5,000 rare earth deposits valued at more than USD 46 trillion.

The SCO forum has continued to serve as a platform for India to prevent Central Asia from becoming increasingly vulnerable to Chinese influence. It also enables India to pursue its geopolitical and economic interests in Eurasia, grounded in longstanding civilisational, spiritual, and cultural ties. Even before and after the summit, the Prime Minister also held bilateral meetings with leaders from Myanmar, the Maldives, Central Asia, Belarus, Russia, Armenia, and Egypt to strengthen diplomatic relations.

The SCO also provided India and China with a platform for direct dialogue, and both nations voiced their willingness to find common ground on bilateral issues despite notable differences. These issues include border demarcation and Chinese investments in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which challenge India's sovereignty and territorial integrity. Forums like BRICS and SCO, led by the Global South, have seen a thaw in bilateral relations. In 2024, leaders from both countries met at the BRICS summit in Kazan. They reportedly reached a mutually satisfactory resolution regarding the military standoff along the Line of Actual Control in eastern Ladakh. During the bilateral meeting with the Indian Prime Minister, President XI stated that it is the “right choice” for both countries to be “friends” and referred to the two nations as ancient civilisations in the East, also recalling the last meeting in Kazan. The Indian Prime Minister stated that New Delhi is committed to advancing relations grounded in mutual trust, respect, and sensitivity, while also highlighting concerns over cross-border terrorism.

India and China: From Rivalry to Reset

In this era marked by wars, conflicts, tariffs, and rising geopolitical tensions, Beijing and New Delhi must collaborate from a long-term strategic perspective, considering their increasing responsibilities to promote multilateralism and a multipolar world. This is vital for global peace and prosperity, not only in Eurasia but worldwide. The Prime Minister’s visit to China for the SCO demonstrates New Delhi’s understanding of the importance of multilateral forums like SCO and BRICS for India to advance its own geopolitical, security, and geoeconomic interests across different regions. Now, China needs to decide how to progress in stabilising the relationship with India by implementing specific measures, such as granting greater market access to Indian goods and IT services, and pressuring Pakistan to abandon state-sponsored terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir.

Multilateralism on India’s Terms

At a time when wars, tariffs, and geopolitical rivalries unsettle the global order, India’s return to the SCO underscores the value it places on multilateralism. Modi’s participation should not be mistaken for weakness but recognised as strategic pragmatism. For India, forums like the SCO and BRICS serve as platforms to amplify its voice, defend its security interests, and expand its economic footprint in Eurasia.

Now the onus shifts to Beijing. If China is serious about stabilising ties, it must deliver on specifics: opening its markets to Indian goods and IT services, and pressuring Pakistan to dismantle its terror infrastructure. Only then can the SCO move beyond symbolism to become a credible pillar of multipolar stability.

(The writer is the Vice President at the Observer Research Foundation. Views expressed are personal.)